Ehrman begins his fourth chapter, “The Consequences of Sin,” by detailing horrific things humans do to each other. Then he asks “How can human beings… treat other human beings in this way?” (96). Indeed, much suffering is the result of people hurting each other.
Ehrman’s Problem 11: It’s Hard to Argue with the Consequences of Sin Read More »
This is my last post on Ehrman’s errors regarding his understanding of the classical view of suffering—that God punishes people for their sins. Here I will focus on what he calls “unfortunate historical realities.” Ehrman complains that the “predictions of future success and happiness” promised Israel if they obeyed “never did come to fulfillment” (89).
Ehrman’s Problem 10: Special Pleading Read More »
My first two posts on Ehrman’s discussion of the “classical view” of suffering—that God punishes people for their sins—were mostly about clearing up ambiguities and misapplications. In this blog we come to some unambiguous examples of God punishing people for their sins which Ehrman protests. For example, Ehrman is dismayed about the destruction of the
Ehrman’s Problem 9: He Minimizes the Horror of Sin Read More »
Ehrman points out that the “classical view” of suffering—that God is punishing people for their sins—does have some merit: “The prophets, in short, were concerned about issues of real life—poverty, homelessness, injustice, oppression, the uneven distribution of wealth, the apathetic attitudes of those who have it good toward those who are poor, helpless, and outcast.
Ehrman’s Problem 8: The Strawman Read More »
In my first series on Ehrman’s book God’s Problem, I reviewed some of his random ramble through the free will defense (there’s more to come). Now in his chapters two and three we turn to an even longer ramble spanning 69 pages!—of what he calls “the classical view of suffering”: that sometimes people suffer because
Ehrman’s Problem 7: The “Classical View” & the Holocaust Read More »
Ehrman says free will defenders often tell him humans would be like robots without free will (11, 12, 197, 229). Well, of course they tell him that. Rightly! And on this point Ehrman never disagrees because free will is essential to who we are. Consider that God, if He had wanted to, could have created
Ehrman’s Problem: He’s Confused About the Free Will Defense Read More »
Finally we come to what seems to be Ehrman’s major objection to the free will defense. He asks, “If he [God] intervenes sometimes to counteract free will, why does he not do so more of the time? Or indeed, all of the time?” (13). Later he writes, “I can’t believe in that God anymore, because
Ehrman’s Problem 5: God Should Intervene More to Prevent Free Will’s Evil Use Read More »
Bart Ehrman’s fourth objection to the free will defense is this: “Most people who believe in God-given free will also believe in an afterlife. Presumably people in the afterlife will still have free will (they won’t be robots then either, will they?). And yet there won’t be suffering (allegedly) then. Why will people know how
Ehrman’s Problem 4: Why Won’t We Abuse Free Will in Heaven? Read More »
Bart Ehrman asks why God didn’t give humans “the intelligence they need to exercise it [free will] so that we can all live happily and peaceably together? You can’t argue that he wasn’t able to do so, if you want to argue that he is all powerful.” (13)1 This objection is Ehrman’s slant on the
Ehrman’s Problem 3: God Could Have Made Us So We’d Always Do Right Read More »
As I mentioned yesterday, Ehrman admits that free will can explain much human evil, but he asks how it can explain malaria, dysentery, drought, hurricanes, mudslides, or a “tsunami that kills hundreds of thousands overnight.” (12) In other words, how does the misuse of free will explain “natural” evil? Although there are other answers to
Ehrman’s Problem 2: Free Will and Natural Evil Read More »
